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Saharan Africa : The Need for Democratic Reforms 
Osita M. Ogbu 
I. Introduction 
The debate as to whether internal or external factors 
were responsible for the output decline in the agricultural sector 
in the 70s and 80s in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is now a moot one, 
largely confined to the realm of intellectual exercise. African 
governments having "accepted" that internal policy mistakes were 
made embarked on the structural adjustment programs as corrective 
policy measures. These policies are supposed to restructure the 
economy, restore the position of agriculture as the prime basis for 
development in these economies, and create the. environment for 
sustained economic development. Farmers are supposed to benefit 
from the greater openness in the economy: competitive marketing 
channels, improved prices for their produce, dismantling of rent 
seeking centers, greater reliance on the market forces etc. The 
economy is supposed to benefit from the efficiency of the farmers 
and increased supply response that these incentives will elicit. 
After a decade of implementing these policies, the crisis 
appears not to have been stemmed, and farmers' response to 
incentives appears to be slow and timid. Several short term 
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evaluation efforts have been initiatedl, and there are on-going 
-exercises to fine tune the program in recognition of some of the 
undesirable consequences on the vulnerable groups. There is even a 
slight shift from the World Bank's position as articulated by the 
Berg Report (World Bank, 1981), and the views expressed in a new 
report on SSA (World bank, 1989). 
In this new report, "broadening" and "deepening" of structural 
adjustment are recommended for future growth. But the report also 
recognizes that the strategy must be human centered and that good 
governance constitute an essential part of the enabling 
environment. 
Evidence from the literature (Lele, 1988; Smith, 1989; Hans 
Binswanger and others, 1987) suggests that farmers' aggregate 
response to price incentives have been very disappointing, and that 
nonprice factors are more important in stimulating aggregate supply 
response. The traditional nonprice factors often discussed in the 
literature include technology, access to credit, public 
expenditures, infrastructure and institutional bottlenecks etc. 
1 The methodological issues in these evaluations were dealt 
with in Ogbu, 0. M. (1991), "Structural Adjustment a,nd Agricultural 
Supply Response in Sub-Saharan Africa: Synthesis and Limits of 
Current Analysis", A Paper presented at a Joint CODESRIA and IDRC 
Workshop on Structural Adjustment and Agrarian Crisis in Sub- 
Sah-xran Africa held in Ibadan, Nigeria from June 10-14, 1991. 
2 
a 
(see, Ogbu and Gbetibuou, 1990). 
There is no real discussion of good governance as part of the 
enabling environment and therefore constituting a nonprice factor 
in the supply response literature. There are often scanty 
discussions of regime changes as they.. impinge on institutional 
support to the agricultural sector (Lele, (forthcoming); Tdachaba, 
1989). The assumption may be that' the authoritarian regimes are a 
given in SSA and that farmers' response will not be affected by 
what type of regime. is in power. But the structural adjustment 
programs are re-defining state - people relations as the state 
shrinks, and non state agencies emerge to perform "traditional" 
state roles. Thus, farmers, as the subdued ally of the state, feel 
somewhat ambivalent having lost support on the one hand and appear 
to have gained it on the other. There are now serious questions as 
to whose interest is being represented by the state. 
This paper therefore takes as its point of departure the fact 
that good governance should be considered as a nonprice factor 
which inhibits aggregate agricultural supply response. And that 
government accountability, democratic governance, and interest 
group dynamics influence (i) the distribution of gains from 
structural adjustment, and (ii) farmers' long-term behavior and 
allocation of risks, and thus supply response in the agricultural 
2agbu, Osita M. and Mathurin Gbetibuou (1990), "Agricultural 
Supply Response in Sub-Saharan Africa: A critical Review of the 
Literature", African Development Review, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 83-97. 
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sector. 
II. Farmers Group Interests and Distribution of Gains Under 
Structural Ad Lustment 
The free market tenet of structural adjustment is supposed to 
enable the farmer to make optimal decisions on both his input use 
and production choices. His prices will be the price obtainable at 
the market at the point of sale not that pre-determined by the 
marketing boards. Devaluation will increase his local currency 
earning from export, increase his consumption of incentive goods, 
and provide cash for purchases of improved inputs. 
On the other hand, the farmer will have to forego subsidies on 
fertilizer and other inputs, share in the cost of health care and 
educational delivery, deal with multiple agents (privatization) and 
accept a smaller state whose only real role is to provide the 
"enabling environment". The structural adjustment programs also did 
not initially address the question of land reform, credit policies 
and extension services for smallholders. 
Some of the assumptions underlying the implied benefits to the 
farmer are based on free mobility of resources, freedom in 
production decisions, and production of marketable surplus. But as 
we well know arable land is a very serious constraint to 
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agriculture in many parts or SSA (Kenya and Malawi, for instance). 
Therefore, while there is evidence of individual crop response to 
price incentives in SSA (Maitha, 1970), there is still the problem 
of asset fixity, lack of relevant experience and skills to switch 
from one crop to another, many farmers being net purchasers of 
food, and government and interest group control of production and 
distribution decisions. 
In Malawi, production decisions are reserved to the state 
which determines essentially who produces what. The estate sector 
enjoys a privileged' status and is controlled by a few elite. The 
estate is defined here not in term of the size of the farm or the 
extent of its commercialization but by its right to produce, 
sometimes exclusively, certain crops. This right did not disappear 
with the introduction of structural adjustment. Thus, the chosen 
few continued to use the state to secure and consolidate their hold 
on the economy despite the structural adjustment's intent to 
restructure the economy. 
Food market liberalization was introduced in Malawi in 1987. 
But there were initial technical and acceptance problems due to the 
speed of implementation under donor pressure. Although it has 
operated somewhat smoothly, the effectiveness of privatization has 
been marred by government licensing requirements, geographical and 
commodity concentration among the licensed, ADMARC's dominance in 
certain parts of the country, exploitative and dishonest behavior 
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of private traders, and cash flow constraints due to small traders' 
limited access to credit (Scarborough, 1990). All these coupled 
with the information gap limited the benefits from competition, and 
thus the overall benefits to the smallholders. 
Subsidy withdrawal was simultaneous for both the smallholder 
and estate producers despite the other advantages (including direct 
access to international markets, production of lucrative crops 
etc.) enjoyed by the estate producers. Estates produce about 90 
percent of Malawi's agricultural export, and account for 20 percent 
of arable land of which only 6-8% is actually cultivated (Lele, 
1990). The initial response (between 1981 -1984) by smallholders to 
price decontrol in Malawi was a doubling of their output of maize. 
But the five-fold increase in fertilizer prices following the 
withdrawal of subsidies was to have its effect on supply response. 
Comparing 1983-84 and 1986-87, a UNICEF report indicated that 
Malawi's fertilizer consumption declined by 7 percent and the area 
planted with high quality hybrid maize declined by 50 percent 
(African Farmer, 1990). 
In 1989, the government reinstated the fertilizer subsidy 
(perhaps because the fertilizer/maize price ratio remained very 
high), and the production of maize looks lucrative again for the 
smallholder. But continued concern for budget deficits and donor 
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.pressure are likely to lead to another round of subsidy 
withdrawal.3 But more importantly, sustained supply response will 
require much more than the right subsidies and prices. Policy 
intervention focusing on the market structure, market development 
and information, asset distribution involving all factors of 
production (Lele, 1990), greater political openness, and reduction 
in interest group control will be required. 
In Ghana, devaluation led to a doubling of cocoa exports 
between 1984 and 1986. This represented a substantial rise in the 
income of cocoa farmers of Ghana. But, as in most of SSA, the gains 
from this export are skewed in favour of a few farmers. About 32 
percent of cocoa farmers in Ghana, those with very large 
operations, receive 94 percent of the gross cocoa income with the 
remaining 68 percent., mostly smallholders, sharing only 6 percent 
of the income (African Farmer, 1990). These figures are likely to 
worsen for the smallholders if net income is considered since the 
large scale operator is likely to a face a lower cost of 
production, obtain free government services, and generally use his 
influence (alone or in collusion with other large scale farmers) to 
enhance the profitability of his operation. Yet, sustained supply 
response will require that smallholders' share of net income grows 
faster to offset their disadvantage from government withdrawal from 
3 For a discussion of the Fertilizer debate in Malawi, see 
Scarborough, Vanessa (1990), "Agricultural Policy Reforms Under 
Structural Adjustment in Malawi", ADU occasional Paper 12, WYE 
college, University of London. 
f 
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traditional obligations, and changing composition of rural 
household income due in part to the reduction in remittances from 
the urban areas. 
Despite this skewed distribution of-gains from the adjustment 
program, Ghana's adjustment efforts have been hailed as the most 
successful in the continent. While this is partially true, the 
picture is somewhat exaggerated. In 1988, real GDP was only 3 
percent in excess of its 1980 level, and per capita GDP was lower 
than its 1982 levels (Loxley and Young, 1988). Part of this success 
is of course attributable to massive inflow of foreign capital. 
Continued success of the program will depend, in part, on a 
sustained capital inflow, at a higher level than during the first 
phase, since the next phase of adjustment is likely to be harder. 
However, the lack of broad based political consensus for the 
original program means that both the pace of reform and its 
eventual outcome will depend on greater political participation 
more than anything else. 
In Nigeria, with the abolition of the marketing boards, 
traders swamped cocoa producing areas and artificially bid up the 
price of cocoa beyond that obtainable internationally. The only 
plausible explanation for this was that cocoa export was seen, at 
the early stages of the structural adjustment program, as a safe 
means for capital flight. What is important for our purpose though 
is that this situation raised false hope, and essentially served 
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-non-farming population interests, at least in the long run. 
The privatization of marketing channels in Nigeria did not 
eliminate middlemanship nor did it necessarily ensure effective 
competition. The Cocoa Association of Nigeria, which represents 
mainly exporters, are reported to have earned the wrath of small 
farmers who have accused it of forcing down prices in order to 
boost traders' profit !. Thus, privatization has led not only to 
collusion, shady trading practices but also to poor quality control 
which has hurt the reputation of Nigerian Cocoa internationally. 
The government has stepped in again to license cocoa merchants and 
impose standards. This has created another rent seeking centre for 
government employees and middlemen, and increased the transaction 
costs for the weaker cocoa producers. There are recent indications 
that many cocoa farmers are agitated over costly pesticides since 
government subsidized chemicals have 'disappeared' from the 
markets This situation illustrates a case where attempts to reduce 
the impact of government failure has increased market failures and 
changed monitoring arrangements (see, Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). 
Policies to improve the effectiveness of private marketing channels 
will rely on an understanding of both the structure and functioning 
of these marketing channels. Data for such studies are, as yet, 
lacking. 
Kenya: Daily Nation, Saturday, August 24, 1991. 
S See footnote 4. 
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The story is not entirely different in Kenya. Farmers have 
expressed disgust over the lavish life-style of middlemen against 
the background of their own impoverishment. Farmers' concern 
emanate principally from insensitivity of government officials to 
their concerns and delay in paying them.for their produce sold to 
the marketing boards (African Farmer, 1990). Last year this delay 
erupted into a crisis that prompted some coffee producers to uproot 
their coffee plants in order to plant food crops despite the fact 
that this act is illegal (Weekly Review, June 1, 1990). Eventually 
one minister lost his job, but the problems have not eased. Land 
meant for smallholders is constantly being traded for political 
patronage and there is resistance from government officials, some 
of whom derive unofficial power and influence from the marketing 
boards, to the eventual privatization of marketing boards. Again, 
farmers as an unorganized and powerless constituency, have to 
contend with interest groups, and a government that is on paper 
doing everything to motivate production but which in reality 
constitutes a cog in the wheel. 
These examples across Africa illustrate the serious 
impediments to farmers' supply response due to group interests and 
dynamics, the lack of transparency and consistency in government 
policies, and the powerlessness of many of the African farmers. All 
these at a time when African farmers are increasingly asked to bear 
a greater share ir..the cost of their health care and the cost of 
educating their children. These policy slippages, and farmers' 
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'perception of losers and gainers have serious consequences for the 
way farmers allocate risks and make long term investments. (We 
shall return to this in the next section). There is now the 
question of how privatization and weak government control compare 
with government ownership and strong control under the present and 
unreformed political systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The solution lies in giving farmers a greater say and in 
recognizing that policies will affect farmers differently depending 
on their size, and their own individual or collective ability to 
influence events around them. But anything short of an overhaul of 
the political system will not meet with success. This is because 
the interest groups dominated by the. middleclass will resist the 
devolution of power, and hence accountability, since they depend on 
the state for economic survival and are likely to impede rather 
than encourage political competition (Shaw, 1990). This scenario is 
very likely in most of SSA where there is an accumulated advantage 
of incumbency. 
III. Farmers Allocation of Risk Under Structural Adjustment and 
Closed Political Systems 
The structural adjustment program is designed so that 
microeconomic rationalizations (by removing long-standing 
19 
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''distortions) will raise the marginal efficiency of investment, 
foster long-term investment behavior, and lead to sustainable 
growth. Econometric evidence indicate that adjustment is taking 
place (where they are taking place) through expenditure reductions 
and that includes reduction in investment expenditures (Faini and 
Melo, 1990). 
While analysis of aggregate investment behavior point to the 
general trend, farmers in SSA as a distinct group of investors are 
often not given much of attention in the literature. If the success 
of structural adjustment, as is often proclaimed, depends on the 
success of the agricultural sector,6 it means that farmers' 
perception and allocation of risks and their long-term investment 
behavior are at the root of this success. So the question is : has 
the microeconomic rationalization led to increased factor mobility 
and productivity within the agricultural sector, and thus improved 
the long-term investment behavior of the farmers ? Since farmers 
access to new capital is limited, and there is very little 
likelihood of inter-sectoral transfer of resources, it means that 
higher investment in agriculture will depend on increased savings 
rate by farmers. Therefore, beginning to emerge is some sort of 
contradiction between the requirement for higher savings on the one 
6 This status quo argument is now being challenged by those 
who are indicating that SSA countries cannot afford to "continue to 
do what they do best" since part of the SSA crisis is due to 
falling purchasing power of her exports brought about by the 
primary nature of these exports. At least middle income African 
countries should start diversifying their exports into manufactures 
(Culpeper, 1987). I have some sympathy for this argument. 
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.,hand, and increased cost sharing for social services which most 
programs call for, on the other. This contradiction becomes real 
and enlarged if the present political systems mirror what the 
future holds- a state of economic hopelessness and political 
helplessness. 
Certain factors affect adversely the risk behavior of farmers 
in SSA. Some of these are uncertain and low rainfall, food security 
concerns, farmers' perception of policy and policy makers etc. 
While some of the answers to the above questions are largely 
empirical, we have attempted to show in section II that the 
structural adjustment programs' attempt to eliminate policy induced 
distortions has not been completely successful due to farmers 
powerlessness and middleclass interests. 
Because the political process is closed, farmers cannot force 
any real changes. They view both the government and their policies 
with suspicion and cynicism, divert and sometimes undermine well 
intentioned policies (Shaw, 1990). These have therefore led to 
short-run adjustments behavior instead of long-run behavioral 
changes which the structural adjustment calls for. This feeling of 
alienation reinforces their risk-averse behavior, and engenders! any 
real long-term investment plans. 
Farmers' confidence to invest and participate in production 
also depend on their assessment that government will maintain 
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accountability over time. This will require that decisions in the 
agricultural sector be subject to popular input otherwise, internal 
pressure can produce costly policy flip-flops. For instance, if 
farmers choose sunk investment expenditure in order to reduce 
costs, they may run the risk that government might change its mind, 
and lower prices for the products will prevail when farmers have 
not yet recovered their costs. Such policy flip-flops have been 
noted in Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Malawi. 
This crisis of confidence, and the changing state obligations 
have manifested in the increased number of Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) currently operating in SSA. About $1 billion 
of NGO aid is disbursed annually in Africa. In some Sahelian states 
it represents a significant proportion of total aid to them. The 
same is true for the overall aid to the health sector in SSA (Shaw, 
1990). 
Current trust and relationship between rural farmers in SSA 
and some NGOs are bolstering the NGOs to think that they can 
successfully intervene in the areas where government are 
withdrawing. One is not exactly sure whether the government isn't 
in fact withdrawing because they think someone else will pick up 
the slack, and that the constituency being served is of no 
political consequence. 
Thus, NGO activities while laudable in many ways are not 
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without dangerous consequences. Their actions may tend to widen 
rather than bridge the confidence gap between the rural farmers and 
the government. This can further undermine well intentioned 
government policies since most of the NGO activities are undertaken 
without full appreciation of the macro picture. But, more 
importantly, by intervening in the critical areas of health and 
education and substituting as governments, they may in fact be 
shielding the rural populace from the political process. Therefore, 
rather than empowering the people they may be de-empowering them in 
the long-run by fostering political apathy. 
This is why a recent OXFAM experience in Asia is very 
instructive, and should provide lessons for the future 7. Government 
construction of a dam led to a village being resettled with an 
unfinished well, school and clinic. Instead of OXFAM stepping in to 
provide these facilities, as would have been the traditional NGO 
approach, it instead provided money for organization, and transport 
to take the village representatives to the capital to lobby their 
government. The lobby was successful, the government latter 
provided these services (Tanner, 1991). This is a clear example of 
empowerment of the people. 
1 This is not a blanket endorsement for the NGOs to engage in 
political activities. After all, it is not often that the Agenda of 
the NGOs coincide with that of national governments, and actions 
such as this could easily be subversive. 
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IV. Summary and conclusions 
Farmers' response to structural adjustment incentives, in 
addition to other factors, depends on farmers perception of losers 
and gainers, confidence in the government., and their own ability to 
influence events. Economic liberalization without government 
accountability and political openness means that rent seeking 
centers may have simply shifted rather than disappeared. Interest 
groups (both government officials and private middlemen), 
exploiting farmers powerlessness and lack of organization continue 
to skew the gains from structural adjustment in their favour, and 
thus impede farmers' real response to incentives. 
Privatization of marketing channels in an attempt to correct 
government failures may introduce market failures if conditions for 
effective competition do not exist. In this case partial 
liberalization rather than complete liberalization may be the 
preferred option. But this must be on a case by case basis and care 
must be exercised not to reintroduce distortions. 
Farmers' allocation of risks, and thus long-term investment 
behavior is influenced by government long-term commitment to 
policies as well as the assurance that accountability will be 
maintained over time. Policy slippages and flip-flops are very 
expensive and reinforces farmers' risk-averse behavior. 
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Government withdrawal from its traditional obligations has not 
helped to build confidence. It in fact affects adversely farmers' 
savings rate and the amount of investible capital in the 
agricultural sector. NGOs, taking advantage of weakened states, 
are increasing their intervention in SSA especiAlly in the social 
sector. There are, however, some dangerous consequences to this 
increased intervention. This calls for close supervision of the 
NGOs to ensure that their activities do not undermine national 
agenda, and hurt those that they work to protect. 
If farmers are to fully respond to structural adjustment 
incentives, some sort of political reform will be a necessary 
precondition. This reform should ensure government accountability 
and popular' input into decision making. 
The democratic process and political openness which it entails 
means that policy makers are likely to be representative and 
sensitive to farmers' needs and concerns. Here, the assumption is 
that the views of farmers are not going to be either articulated or 
hijacked by a few emergency and opportunistic farmers. The form of 
this democratic reform could vary but the essential elements of 
accountability, legitimate opposition, popular participation, and 
freedom of expression cannot be traded. 
8 This should not imply that representative leadership should 
not bear some burden in decision making. 
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